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1 Introduction 
John Dugard observes as follows concerning the relationship between public 
international law and municipal law:1 
Whatever the jurisprudential basis for the application of international law in 
municipal law may be, the undeniable fact is that international law is today applied 
in municipal courts with more frequency than in the past. In so doing courts seldom 
question the theoretical explanation for their recourse to international law. 
This phenomenon has profound consequences for certain basic concepts in public 
international law, in particular the traditional dichotomy between monism and 
dualism. It is the aim of this contribution to briefly discuss the recent developments 
in South African and European Union law with regard to this issue. 
2 The distinction between monism and dualism 
Monism and dualism represent two different approaches towards the relationship 
between public international law and municipal law. Broadly speaking, the former 
views public international law and municipal law as a single system of law, whereas 
the latter regards these two areas of law as separate and distinct legal systems that 
exist alongside each other. According to a monist approach public international law 
is therefore directly enforceable before municipal courts without any need for 
incorporation into municipal law. A dualist approach, on the contrary, implies that 
public international law has to be formally incorporated into municipal law before it 
would be enforceable before a municipal court. A complicating factor is that not all 
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legal systems are clearly and distinctly either monist or dualist. Some legal systems 
display elements of both. 
The dichotomy between monism and dualism is no longer relevant to only the 
relationship between public international law (including regional law) and municipal 
law,2 but since the development of regional organisations such as the European 
Union it also exerts an influence on the relationship between public international law 
and regional law. It is the purpose of this contribution to discuss the latest 
developments concerning the relationship between public international law and 
municipal law with specific reference to the distinction between monism and dualism 
as evident from recent court decisions in South Africa and the European Union. 
3 South African law 
The relationship in South Africa between public international law and municipal law 
is regulated by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.3 From the 
2  On the topic of the authority of European Union law in the domestic law of member states, see 
for example, Martinico and Pollicino Interaction between Europe's Legal Systems 18-56. Also see 
in this regard Van Ooik "European Court of Justice" 11-40; Wessel "Integration by Stealth" 41-
50. 
3  Apart from ss 231 and 232 of the Constitution of the Republc of South Africa, 1996, which will be 
the focus of this contribution, the following can be referred to: Preamble: It is evident from the 
outset that South Africa is prepared to adhere to public international law insofar as the preamble 
to the Constitution declares that the Constitution is adopted as the supreme law of the Republic 
so as to build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign 
state in the family of nations.3 The implication is clear: a state can take its rightful place in the 
family of nations only if it abides by public international law. This attitude is further embodied in 
a number of specific provisions of the Constitution regarding the importance of public 
international law in South African municipal law. Chronologically the following provisions of the 
Constitution are relevant: S 35(3)(l): Every accused person has the right not to be tried for an 
act or an omission that is not an offence under either national law or international law. S 
37(4)(b)(i): A declaration of a state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to 
the extent that the particular legislation is consistent with the Republic's obligations under 
international law applicable to states of emergency. S 39(1)(b): When interpreting the Bill of 
Rights a court must consider international law. S 84: In terms of s 84(2)(h) the President is 
responsible for receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives, and 
according to s 84(2)(h) for appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and 
consular representatives. S 198: In terms of s 198(b) national security in South Africa is 
governed by the principle that any one of its citizens is precluded from participating in armed 
conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or 
national legislation. S 198(c) provides that national security must be pursued in compliance with 
the law, including international law. S 199(5): The security services of South Africa must act and 
must teach and require their members to act in accordance with the Constitution and the law, 
including customary international law and international agreements binding on the Republic. S 
200(2): The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect South Africa, its 
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provisions of especially sections 231 and 232 of the Constitution it is clear that the 
South African approach is a combination of both the monist and dualist schools. 
These provisions determine inter alia as follows: In terms of section 231(2) an 
international agreement binds South Africa only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. 
Section 231(3) provides that some international agreements, such as those of a 
technical, administrative or executive nature, or those which do not require either 
ratification or accession, bind South Africa without approval by the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. According to section 231(4) any 
international agreement becomes law in South Africa when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation, excluding a so-called self-executing provision of an agreement, 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of Parliament. Section 232 
determines that customary international law is law in South Africa unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of Parliament. In view of these provisions 
one can therefore say that South Africa follows a monist approach with regard to 
customary international law, but a dualist one as far as treaties are concerned. The 
result is that customary international law is directly enforceable before a South 
African court, while treaty law must first be incorporated into South African 
legislation before it becomes enforceable in municipal law. Dugard4 suggests that the 
nature of South Africa's approach can be described as one of harmonisation, 
because it is primarily aimed at harmonising public international law and South 
African domestic law. 
territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of 
international law regulating the use of force. S 203(1): The President as head of the executive 
may declare a state of national defence. Unlike previous constitutions under the Westminster 
system, the President is not authorised in terms of the current Constitution to declare war, the 
reason being that such an action would be in violation of those public international law norms 
prohibiting the use of force between states. This section, however, confirms South Africa's right 
to act in self-defence as regulated in a 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. S 233: When 
interpreting any legislation, a court must prefer any reasonable interpretation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international 
law. S 235: The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination is recognised, 
including the right to self-determination within a specific territory of any community sharing a 
common cultural and language heritage. 
4  Dugard International Law 42-43. 
1473 
                                                                                                                          
G FERREIRA AND A FERREIRA-SNYMAN  PER / PELJ 2014(17)4 
A number of issues embodied in the provisions on the relationship between public 
international law and municipal law need further clarification. Firstly, the Constitution 
does not deal with the binding nature of jus cogens norms and erga omnes 
obligations in South African law. Without attempting to discuss these concepts 
exhaustively, it can be stated that these so-called higher norms of international law 
are peremptory in nature, may not be deviated from and are thus binding on states 
even without their consent. Although it is by no means always clear which 
international law norms and obligations qualify for the status of jus cogens5 and erga 
omnes6 obligations (and whether and to what extent these concepts coincide), the 
applicable principle is nevertheless evident. Despite the fact that the binding nature 
of public international law is based on the consent of states, once there is certainty 
that a particular norm or an obligation has attained the status of jus cogens or an 
obligation erga omnes, all states, irrespective of their consent, are deemed to be 
bound thereby. As a matter of principle the provisions in the South African 
Constitution subjecting by implication jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations 
to acts of Parliament and even the supreme Constitution therefore might in 
themselves (depending on the circumstances of a particular case) amount to a 
violation of the public international law norm regulating the binding nature of jus 
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations.7 Secondly, the (foreign) concept8 of a 
5  A 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) introduced the concept of jus 
cogens into international law. Although the doctrine seems to be well-entrenched in international 
law, the precise content of jus cogens and how to determine whether a particular rule qualifies 
for this status or not is not completely clear. There is little doubt that the prohibition of 
aggression is peremptory, while the prohibitions against slavery, genocide, racial discrimination 
(including apartheid), torture and the denial of self-determination enjoy widespread support to 
qualify for this status. See in this regard Dugard International Law 38-39. 
6  The concept of erga omnes obligations was formulated in 1970 by the International Court of 
Justice in Barcelona Traction, Light and Company Pty Ltd 1970 ICJ Reports 3 para 32. The 
concept has subsequently on several occasions been mentioned by the International Court of 
Justice and described as obligations towards the international community as a whole, which 
include the outlawing of acts of aggression and genocide; principles and rules concerning the 
basic rights of the human person, such as protection from slavery and racial discrimination; the 
rights of peoples to self-determination and certain obligations under humanitarian law. As such, 
the concept concerns a matter of state responsibility. See Kadelbach "Jus Cogens" 35. 
7 Paulus 2005 Nordic J Int'l L 320 points out that the extent to which states would recognise the 
application of jus cogens in their domestic systems would depend on whether or not the 
particular state recognises the direct effect of international law in its domestic law. In contrast to 
the South African position, Switzerland, for example, recognises the superiority of jus cogens to 
the state Constitution by excluding any derogation from jus cogens by amendments to the 
Constitution. See in this regard Peters "Globalization of State Constitutions" 269-270. 
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self-executing provision is not defined by the Constitution. Once again, without 
attempting to discuss this issue in depth, it would suffice to state that despite a 
number of court cases and various academic articles dealing with this issue, South 
African law has thus far not succeeded in clarifying the legal position by giving a 
South African-specific content to this provision.9 Thirdly, section 231(4) seems to 
limit the precedence of the Constitution and acts of Parliament over international 
agreements to only a (specific) self-executing provision of an international 
agreement, and not an agreement as a whole. It is suggested that a broad 
interpretation of section 231(4) should be followed in this regard to also include 
international agreements in their entirety. The superiority of the Constitution is 
explicitly confirmed in section 2 of the Constitution in so far as it is elevated to the 
status of the supreme law of South Africa. However, the precedence that an act of 
Parliament takes over a self-executing provision of an international agreement 
stands in tension with section 233 in terms of which legislation must be construed to 
give effect to international law rather than to be inconsistent with international law. 
In view of this, an act of Parliament should take precedence over a self-executing 
provision only if it is not possible to interpret the act in line with the self-executing 
provision. 
It must be emphasised that the relationship between municipal law and international 
law is by no means static. Although as a general observation it can be stated that 
municipal law enjoys precedence on the national level and international law on the 
international level, two processes running concurrently are indicative of the ever 
changing nature of the divide between these two systems of law, namely the so-
called constitutionalisation of international law and the internationalisation of 
constitutional law. The final outcomes of these processes are by no means clear, but 
they could eventually result, on the one hand, in state constitutions displaying 
remarkable similarities and, on the other hand, in the development of a single 
8 Foreign in the sense that it is an American legal concept that has been imported into South 
African law. See, for example, Ngolele 2006 SAYIL 141-172. 
9 See, for example, De Wet "South Africa" 573-578; Botha 2009 SAYIL 253-267; Scholtz and 
Ferreira 2008 CILSA 324-338. 
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international constitution for the entire international community.10 Ginsberg, 
Chernykh and Elkins11 argues that the functions of public international law should not 
be considered only from an interstate but also from an intrastate perspective. The 
authors show that the interaction between domestic law and international law as 
reflected in the dichotomy between monism and dualism varies considerably 
between states.12 Notwithstanding these differences, the authors eventually conclude 
that 
internationalization, broadly speaking, has increased over time, with more 
constitutions incorporating specific treaties, providing for treaty superiority over 
domestic legislation, and making customary law directly applicable, even as the 
scope of customary law has expanded dramatically.13 
The provisions of national legislation incorporating an international agreement into 
South African law would normally be applied by the courts even if they are 
contradictory to the provisions of the incorporated international agreement because 
it is left to Parliament to decide if and to what extent an agreement should be 
incorporated. This is understandable in view of the fact that South Africa follows a 
dualist approach with regard to international agreements, and that the binding 
nature of public international law, and in particular treaty law, is based on the 
consent of the parties to the agreement. However, the Children's Act14 is an 
exception in this regard. Section 256(2) provides with regard to the Hague 
Convention on Inter-Country Adoption that "where there is a conflict between the 
ordinary law of the Republic and the Convention, the Convention prevails". Ordinary 
law in this sense probably includes both statutory law and common law. The 
implication of this provision is that under certain circumstances the Convention is 
superior to South African law and as such the latter portrays signs of a monist 
approach.15 
10 See, for example, Ferreira and Ferreira-Snyman 2008 SAYIL 147. 
11 Ginsberg, Chernykh and Elkins 2008 U Ill L Rev 237. 
12 Ginsberg, Chernykh and Elkins 2008 U Ill L Rev 204-205. 
13 Ginsberg, Chernykh and Elkins 2008 U Ill L Rev 210. 
14 Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
15 See in this regard Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [2011] ZACC 6 para [100] 
(hereafter Glenister). 
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With regard to the Bill of Rights the Constitution in section 39(1)(b) employs public 
international law only as an aid to interpret the rights contained in the Bill. In this 
respect, based on a similar provision in the Interim Constitution (section 35(1)),16 
the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane17 confirmed that this provision includes 
public international law that is both binding and not binding on South Africa. The 
Court nevertheless emphasised that there is in terms of this provision no duty on 
South Africa to give effect to public international law – it merely requires a court to 
consider it in view of the peculiarities of the South African Bill of Rights.18 What has 
to be enforced is the Bill of Rights and not so much the relevant norms of public 
international law. As a general proposition, however, one can state that South 
African law requires courts to follow public international law where possible. This is 
borne out by section 233 of the 1996 Constitution which provides that a court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international 
law.19 In terms of the Constitution, public international law fulfills the role of an 
interpretative aid not only with regard to the Constitution's Bill of Rights but also in 
respect of all forms of South African legislation (section 233). The requirement in the 
Constitution that international law must be employed as an interpretative aid might, 
however, have a profound influence on the incorporation of international law 
principles into South African law insofar as mere interpretation, without any 
(constitutionally prescribed) formal incorporation might result in the adoption of 
international law principles into the domestic law of South Africa. In a sense this 
could be viewed as a form of monism. 
In some instances the Constitution explicitly states that public international law is 
binding on South Africa without any reference to the need for legislative 
incorporation into domestic law, for example the determination in section 231(2) 
that an international agreement binds South Africa once it has been approved by 
16 S 35(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
17 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para [35]. See also Glenister para [39]. 
18 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras [36]-[37]. 
19 For the application of s 233, see International Trade Administration Commission v Scaw South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZACC 6 paras [42]-[44], [83]-[85]. In this regard reference should also be 
made to the well-known presumption in South African law which entails that a legislative 
enactment is not aimed at violating international law. See Du Plessis Re-interpretation of 
Statutes 173. 
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resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. The 
Constitution does not state in this instance on what level South Africa is bound, but 
it can be accepted that it is on the international level (that is vis-á-vis other states), 
particularly in view of the fact that the Constitution in terms of section 231(4) 
requires legislative incorporation of public international law into municipal law before 
it can be enforced domestically. 
Section 231(2) played a pivotal role in the decision of the Constitutional Court in 
Glenister20 against the background of monism and dualism. As has been shown 
above, the Constitution as the supreme law of South Africa extensively determines 
the relationship between public international law and municipal law. However, the 
Constitutional Court's decision in Glenister has important implications for the 
question of whether a monist or a dualist approach should be followed in a particular 
instance. In Glenister the Court was divided on the correct interpretation of a 
number of constitutional provisions dealing with the binding nature of international 
treaties in South African law. 
The facts leading to the decision in Glenister can for purposes of this note briefly be 
summarised as follows:21 The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), a specialised 
crime fighting unit located within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), was 
disbanded and replaced with the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) 
situated within the South African Police Service (SAPS). In Glenister the 
Constitutional Court was then requested inter alia to deal with the question of 
whether the Constitution requires Parliament to establish an independent anti-
corruption unit, and if so, whether Parliament complied. In addition, the Court was 
asked to establish if any rights in the Bill of Rights were infringed by the acts of 
Parliament which gave practical effect to the situation before the Court.22 
Chief Justice Ngcobo, supported by three other Constitutional Court judges, 
delivered a minority judgement in which he argued as follows: section 231(2) does 
not imply that an international agreement approved (ratified) by Parliament becomes 
20 Glenister. For a discussion, see Swanepoel 2013 LitNet Akademies (Regte). 
21 Glenister para [1]. 
22 Glenister para [54]. 
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law in the Republic upon such approval. It becomes law in the Republic only once it 
has been incorporated in terms of section 231(4) into domestic law by an act of 
Parliament.23 The minority judgement emphasises that ratification is not without 
consequences. It is an indication of South Africa's intention to be bound on the 
international level by the provisions of the particular agreement and a failure on 
South Africa's part to honour its provisions may therefore result in responsibility 
towards the other state parties to the agreement.24 Ratification does not result in 
transforming the rights and obligations contained in an international agreement into 
constitutional rights and obligations.25 Domestic enforcement is dependent on 
incorporation: "[T]he legislative act which incorporates the international agreement 
into domestic law has the effect of transforming an international obligation that 
binds the sovereign at the international level into domestic legislation that binds the 
state and citizens as a matter of domestic law."26 The minority judgement is at pains 
to point out that firstly, the use of public international law as an interpretive aid 
"do[es] not create rights and obligations in the domestic legal space",27 for that 
would be tantamount to "incorporat[ing] the provisions of the unincorporated 
convention into our municipal law by the back door".28 He secondly argues that "the 
incorporation of an international agreement does not transform the rights and 
obligations embodied in the international agreement into constitutional rights and 
obligations. It only transforms them into statutory rights and obligations that are 
enforceable in our law under the national legislation incorporating the agreement".29 
The majority judgement delivered by Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke and Judge 
Cameron and supported by three other Constitutional Court judges differs radically 
from that of the minority. The majority judgement reasons as follows with reference 
to a number of regional and international instruments concerning the prevention of 
corruption: The court points out that section 231(2) is primarily directed at the 
23 Glenister para [89]-[92]. 
24 Glenister paras [91]-[92]. 
25 Glenister para [103]. 
26 Glenister para [94]. 
27 Glenister para [96]. 
28 Glenister para [98]. Justice Ngcobo refers in this regard with approval to the Canadian case of 
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] 183 CLR 273 286-287. 
29 Glenister para [102]. Our emphasis. 
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Republic's legal obligations under international law, rather than aimed at 
transforming the rights and obligations contained in international agreements into 
constitutional rights and obligations. Although the section provides that the 
agreement binds the Republic it must be read in conjunction with section 231(4). 
The latter provides that an international agreement becomes law in the Republic 
only when it is enacted into law by national legislation. In view of the fact that 
section 231(4) expressly provides for the domestication of international agreements, 
the court argues that section 231(2) does not have the effect of giving binding 
internal constitutional force to agreements merely because Parliament has approved 
them. The incorporation of an international agreement creates ordinary domestic 
statutory obligations. Incorporation by itself does not transform the rights and 
obligations contained in such an instrument into constitutional rights and 
obligations.30 
The majority judgement confirms that section 231(2) has consequences in the 
international sphere. This means that an international agreement approved by 
Parliament becomes binding between the Republic and other states parties to the 
agreement on the international level. But the court is adamant that this fact does not 
necessarily imply that section 231(2) has no domestic effect whatsoever. On the 
contrary, the fact that section 231(2) itself provides that an agreement so approved 
binds the Republic has a significant impact on the state's domestic obligations in 
protecting and fulfilling the Rights in the Bill of Rights.31 
The obligations in the international agreements32 referred to by the court impose on 
the Republic the duty in international law to create an anti-corruption unit that is 
endowed with the necessary independence. The court once again emphasises that 
this duty exists not only in the international sphere, and is enforceable not only on 
that level. The Constitution itself requires the state to fulfil the duties contained in 
the said international agreements in the domestic sphere also. In coming to this 
30 Glenister para [181[. 
31 Glenister para [182]. 
32 The international and regional conventions referred to by the Court (para [167]) include inter alia 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2004) and the African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption (2004). 
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conclusion the court argues as follows: section 7(2) requires the state to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. Implicit in section 7(2) is 
the requirement that the state has to take positive steps to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. These steps must be reasonable 
and effective.33 In this regard section 39(1)(b) is also of major importance. It 
provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights a court is obliged to consider 
international law. And the relevant international instruments taken into account by 
the court unequivocally require of South Africa to establish an anti-corruption entity 
with the necessary independence.34 
The court is at pains to reiterate that the result of its approach is not to incorporate 
international agreements into the Constitution. The said approach simply implies that 
the court is faithful to the Constitution itself by giving meaning to the ambit of the 
duties it creates in accordance with its own clear interpretive injunctions. The 
conclusion reached by the court, namely that the Constitution requires the state to 
create an anti-corruption entity with adequate independence is therefore intrinsic in 
the provisions of the Constitution itself. 
The question that immediately arises is what is the practical effect of the majority 
judgement's reasoning concerning the relationship between public international law 
and municipal law? The main difference between the minority and majority 
judgements for the purposes of this contribution has to do with the interpretation of 
section 231(2). The minority judgement's interpretation seems to confirm the 
traditional dualist position in terms of which an international agreement ratified but 
not incorporated is binding on the international level only. To have any domestic 
effect it has to be incorporated into domestic law in terms of section 231(4). The 
majority judgement prefers a different interpretation of section 231(2). It is 
unequivocal in its statement that this section has implications for both international 
law and domestic law. The effect it has on domestic law can be described as follows: 
The Constitution in section 231(2) makes a ratified (but not incorporated) 
international agreement binding on South Africa on the international level and can 
33 Glenister para [189]. 
34 Glenister para [192]. 
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be viewed as a codification of the traditional international law position. If, however, 
section 231(2) is read in conjunction with section 7(2) the former might also bring 
about a domestic law duty for South Africa in the field of human rights. One could 
therefore probably say that the Constitution elects to extend the implications of 
section 231(2) also to domestic law in those instances where a duty in an 
international human rights agreement has been accepted by ratification of the said 
agreement. Section 7(2) forces the state to take reasonable steps to give effect to 
that particular duty in domestic law and in that way respect, protect, promote and 
fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights. Section 39(1) in turn obliges a court to take 
international law into account when interpreting the Bill of Rights, and this includes 
any international human rights duties the state has accepted by ratification of the 
particular agreement. Although the majority judgement is at pains to point out that 
its approach must not be understood to amount to an incorporation of an 
international agreement (that position is regulated in terms of section 231(4)), one 
must, however, also point out that the practical effect of the majority judgement's 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution is to allow the 
Constitution to impose a monist approach insofar as a human rights duty on a state 
contained in an international agreement and accepted by South Africa by ratification 
of the said agreement finds application in domestic law without formal incorporation 
in terms of national legislation. It must be emphasised that the majority judgement's 
approach, although limited to Bill of Rights issues, is to be welcomed as it is fully in 
line with the Constitutional Court's earlier findings that the Bill of Rights must be 
interpreted extensively which, it is suggested, should relate not only to the contents 
of the individual rights but also to any unnecessary stumbling blocks in the way of 
realising the particular rights.35 
It is interesting to note that one of the constitutional court judges who delivered the 
majority judgement in Glenister, Justice Edwin Cameron, recently published a 
discussion of the case in which he explicitly states that the majority decision "goes 
far further" than merely interpreting legislation in the light of the relevant 
35 See S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) para [14]. 
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international law provisions.36 He emphasises that the Glenister approach "draws 
international law directly into the domestic sphere, using the provisions of the 
Constitution itself. Yet it does so without adopting a monist approach".37 He 
formulates the effect of section 231 of the Constitution as follows:38 
While section 231 does not have the effect of elevating all international obligations 
to the status of constitutional obligations, it does mean (when read with other 
provisions of the Constitution) that the state's international obligations are 
enforceable to some degree on the domestic plane, by domestic actors. 
Justice Cameron's viewpoint that the approach of the majority in Glenister does not 
amount to the adoption of a monist approach may be questioned. Even though the 
approach of the majority is based on the (interpretation of the) provisions of the 
Constitution itself, the practical effect is undeniably that certain international 
obligations accepted by South Africa form part and parcel of South African law and 
may be enforced accordingly.39 The further question arises as to whether or not the 
Court could have employed any alternative approaches to avoid the requirements of 
section 231(4), namely incorporation into South African law by national legislation. 
Two possibilities seem to be available. Firstly, the Court could have argued that the 
international treaty provision concerning the independence of the investigating unit 
is a self-executing provision which in terms of section 231(4) does not require 
legislative incorporation. Secondly, the Court could have investigated the possibility 
that the said international treaty provision has attained the status of customary 
international law which, according to section 232, is part of South African law and 
therefore does not need to be legislatively incorporated into South African law. Both 
of these possibilities are unfortunately surrounded by a lot of uncertainty and it is 
understandable that the Court elected to follow an approach that favours legal 
certainty. It must nevertheless be emphasised that the Court's approach itself is not 
devoid of any uncertainty. In fact, the Court's decision is not entirely clear on the 
circumstances under which its approach should or could be followed. As a result the 
boundaries between sections 231(2) and 231(4) are becoming increasingly blurred. 
36 Cameron 2013 Duke J Comp Int'l L 405. 
37 Cameron 2013 Duke J Comp Int'l L 405. 
38 Cameron 2013 Duke J Comp Int'l L 406. 
39 The question of whether or not such treaty obligations may be viewed as self-executing 
provisions in terms of s 231(4) is not dealt with in this contribution. 
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In a number of instances the Constitution seems to determine by implication that 
public international law is binding on South Africa without any legislative 
incorporation. A case in point is section 198(c), that requires national security to be 
pursued in compliance with international law, and section 195(5), that places a duty 
on the security services to act in accordance with customary international law and 
international agreements binding on South Africa. In this regard customary 
international law presents no problem as it forms part of South African law and is 
therefore automatically binding on South Africa. The uncertainty relating to the 
provisions in question concerns the binding nature of international agreements. 
What are the implications for the enforcement of these provisions if the relevant 
international agreements have not been incorporated into South African law? The 
Constitution's reference to international law should be understood to include both 
customary international law and treaty law. Insofar as the provisions under 
discussion refer to international agreements binding on the Republic, incorporation is 
clearly required. The provision that national security must be pursued in compliance 
with international law is formulated as a principle that governs national security in 
South Africa and should not be taken to have done away with the requirement of 
incorporation. It is suggested, however, that in this regard the international duties 
incurred by South Africa in terms of international agreements could be enforced by 
following the approach espoused by the majority judgement in Glenister. 
Barber,40 with reference to public international law, observes that "rules of 
international law that are not incorporated into domestic law may still be followed by 
state officers and institutions". He cites the example of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which was ratified by the United Kingdom in 1951 but was 
transformed into domestic law only in 1998, when the Human Rights Act came into 
force. During this period it was nonetheless widely accepted that both the legislature 
and the executive were bound by the Convention in the sense that that they were 
expected to legislate and act in line with its provisions. 
40 Barber Constitutional State 80. 
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This viewpoint of Barber immediately brings into question the value of the dualist 
approach adhered to by the United Kingdom (and South Africa). It is suggested that 
whereas the monist tradition might result in conflicting rules between domestic law 
and international law, the dualist approach to a large extent eliminates this 
possibility insofar as only those international law rules that comply with domestic law 
are incorporated into the latter. The example referred to by Barber, however, may 
be seen as an illustration of the diminishing importance of the dualist tradition. 
Where a conflict between domestic law and international law occurs, it could be 
resolved by applying constitutional provisions such as sections 232 and 233 of the 
South African Constitution. 
4 European Union law 
The relationship between European Union law and public international law has been 
explained by the European Court of Justice in Kadi v Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities.41 The Court had to decide on the 
validity of a European regulation that implemented a resolution of the Security 
Council of the United Nations in terms of which certain restrictions were placed on 
specific individuals who were suspected of having ties with terrorist organisations. 
The Court followed a dualist approach by accepting that European Union law and 
public international law represent two distinct legal systems, and that the latter 
could permeate the former only insofar as is permitted by the constitutional 
principles of the European Union.42 International agreements do not trump European 
41 Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities joined 
cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P (3 September 2008). 
42 As articulated in paras 21 and 24 of the opinion of Advocate General P Maduro delivered on 16 
January 2008. (Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P (3 September 2008)). This is in 
accordance with earlier statements by the European Court of Justice on the status of European 
Community law: in NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration) ECR 
Case 26/62 (5 February 1963) 1 12 the European Court of Justice stated that the Community 
"constitutes a new legal order of international law". In the subsequent Flaminio Costa v ENEL 
(reference for a preliminary ruling by the Guidice Conciliatore di Milano ECR Case 6/64 (15 July 
1964) 585 593 the Court confirmed this separate character of Community law by maintaining 
that "[b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the ECC has created its own legal 
system". In Commission of the European Economic Community v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
and Kingdom of Belgium ECR Case 90, 91/63 (13 November 1964) 625 631 the Court holds a 
similar view by determining that "the Treaty is not limited to creating reciprocal obligations 
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Union law, and "cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of 
the EC Treaty ..."43 
However, in the recent case of Hungary v Slovak Republic44 the European Court of 
Justice seems to have diverted from its previous position to a more monist 
approach.45 The issue decided on in Hungary briefly concerned the following: the 
Hungarian president was to visit the Slovakian town of Komárno on 21 August 2009. 
Due to Slovakian sensitivities still surrounding the invasion of the former 
Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 by five Warsaw Pact countries including Hungary, 
the Slovakian government formally refused the Hungarian president entry into the 
Slovak Republic for security reasons. European Union law accepts that security 
reasons may constitute a valid exception to the right which granted all European 
Union citizens the right to move freely within the member of European Union. The 
dispute between the two countries was eventually brought before the European 
Court of Justice by Hungary. The Court dismissed Hungary's claim that Slovakia had 
violated European Union law by refusing him entry into its territory. The Court 
confirmed that article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
granted every citizen of the European Union the right to move freely within the 
Union. The question before the Court was whether the fact that a person's status as 
head of state constituted a valid limitation on his or her right to free movement. In 
order to answer this question, the Court formulated its point of departure as follows: 
"... EU law must be interpreted in the light of the relevant rules of international law, 
since international law is part of the European Union legal order and is binding on 
between the different natural and legal persons to whom it is applicable, but establishes a new 
legal order which governs the powers, rights and obligations of the said persons, as well as the 
necessary procedures for taking cognizance of and penalising any breach of it". In an analysis of 
the question of whether or not European law constitutes a separate legal system from 
international law, Hartley 2001 BYIL 10-17 reaches the conclusion that the special features of 
the Community treaties do not conclusively indicate that the member states intended to exclude 
international law in the functioning of Community law. However, the European Court of Justice 
has on numerous occasions, as indicated here above, held otherwise. Since the decision of the 
Court on the interpretation of the Community treaties is conclusive, Hartley accepts that, to the 
fullest extent permitted by international law, the legal system of the European Union is separate 
from international law. 
43 Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities joined 
cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P (3 September 2008) para 285. 
44 Hungary v Slovak Republic Case C-364/10 (16 October 2012). 
45 See in this regard Anon 2013 Harv L Rev 2425. 
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the institutions..."46 In view of this point of departure the Court found that the 
question as to whether or not a person's status as head of state constituted a 
limitation on his or her right to free movement must be decided in terms of 
international law. The Court eventually found that heads of state enjoy a particular 
status in international relations which, as a result, impose a duty on the host state to 
guarantee their protection. Thus, the Slovakian government was able to deny the 
president of Hungary entry into its territory on the ground that his safety could not 
be guaranteed. 
The decision in Hungary, when contrasted with the same Court's findings in Kadi, 
creates uncertainty as to the relationship between international law and European 
Union law. Kadi was rather explicit in its viewpoint that European Union law enjoys 
supremacy over international law insofar as the latter may be applied only to the 
extent that is allowed by European Union law. In direct contrast to Kadi, the same 
Court in Hungary unequivocally stated that international law is part of European 
Union law. An anonymous author evaluates the decision in Hungary as follows:47 
The ECJ's decision in Hungary espoused the view that international law concepts 
can control the outcome even when core EU constitutional principles, such as the 
right of free movement,48 are at stake. In so doing, the ECJ may have defined 
some of the limits of the dualist principle articulated in Kadi, according to which EU 
and international law are separate and distinct, and perhaps even presaged a shift 
toward a more monist view, whereby the two are intertwined. While the scope of 
Hungary is unclear and the case may prove to be a context-specific exception to 
the ECJ's otherwise dualist approach, it might instead suggest a broader role for 
international law within the EU than had previously been thought. 
The practical consequences of the decision in Hungary are described as follows by 
the said anonymous author:49 If Hungary could be interpreted to imply a move away 
from dualism towards monism, it may have profound implications for law-making in 
the European Union. A dualist approach and any decision on the incorporation of 
international law norms into European Union law would normally depend on the 
46 Hungary v Slovak Republic Case C-364/10 (16 October 2012) para 44. Our emphasis. 
47 Anon 2013 Harv L Rev 2429-2430. 
48 The right to free movement of people within the European Union is one of the so-called four 
freedoms of the Union. The other three are the freedom to move goods, services and capital 
freely across the borders of the member states of the European Union. See in this regard O'Neill 
EU Law for UK Lawyers 13. 
49 Anon 2013 Harv L Rev 2433-2434. 
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actions of formal law-making institutions such as the European Commission, the 
Council of Europe and the European Parliament. A move towards a monist approach 
would shift this decision-making power away from the legislative institutions of the 
European Union towards the international community as a whole insofar as directly 
applicable international law principles are formed either by international agreement 
or by customary law, which is based on the practice of states and accepted by them 
as a legal obligation.50 The practical effect of the decision in Hungary is thus 
formulated as follows by the anonymous author:51 
In essence, by enhancing the impact of international law on the EU, the Hungary 
court may have increased the capacity of actors outside the EU to shape the EU. 
This may create an EU more reflective of global norms, but perhaps less able to 
adapt to European priorities. 
Apart from its influence on the relationship between international law and European 
Union law, the anonymous author also points out that Hungary might also have 
profound consequences for the relationship between international law and the 
domestic law of a number of member states of the European Union.52 In terms of 
the concepts of direct effect and supremacy developed by the European Court of 
Justice, European Union law relating to individual rights trumps the domestic law of 
member states.53 Broadly speaking, these concepts underline the direct applicability 
and supremacy of European Union law in member states. These facts, coupled with 
the decision in Hungary, pose a serious problem for those member states following a 
dualist approach as far as the relationship between their domestic law and 
international law is concerned. Because European Union law is directly applicable in 
member states (a monist approach) and because international law in terms of 
Hungary is directly incorporated into and forms part of European Union law (a 
monist approach), international law becomes directly applicable in the domestic law 
of member states, including even those following a dualist approach with regard to 
50 Anon 2013 Harv L Rev 2433. 
51 Anon 2013 Harv L Rev 2433. 
52 Anon 2013 Harv L Rev 2434. 
53 See in this regard Ferreira-Snyman 2009 CILSA 201-208. 
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the relationship between their domestic law and public international law.54 The result 
of these developments for the latter states is explained as follows by the anonymous 
discussion of Hungary:55 
Such states could be bound by international provisions that they had not 
affirmatively accepted through either their national legislatures or their political 
representatives in the EU. But because of the principle of supremacy, they cannot 
opt out of such obligations via national legislation. 
In a recent publication, Marcello Neves56 touches upon the role of monism in what 
he refers to as "transconstitutionalism". He points out that the fragmentation of 
(common) constitutional problems would remain unstructured (and, one might add, 
unsolved) if every legal order tried to address them on its own in every case.57 A 
need therefore exists for so-called transconstitutional "conversation" or "dialogue" 
between, for example, the courts of the different legal orders. The question, 
however, remains as to how to finally settle such disputes arising from the different 
interpretations of the various legal orders involved. When a (monist) choice is made 
between so-called competing legal orders, "the order in question would be 'blind' to 
competition from other orders because they would be merely lower layers of a single 
order".58 If such a choice is not made, the different legal orders will exist alongside 
each other in a dualist way (and will in some instances probably be equated with 
legal pluralism).59 
54 Member states of the European Union following a monist approach include the Netherlands and 
France, while the United Kingdom is an example of those member states adhering to a dualist 
doctrine. 
55 Anon 2013 Harv L Rev 2434. 
56 Neves Transconstitutionalism 78-80. 
57 Neves Transconstitutionalism 78. 
58 Neves Transconstitutionalism 79. 
59 See Hesselink "How Many Systems of Private Law are there in Europe?" 199-247. On 246-247 he 
comes to the following conclusion from a private law perspective: "In conclusion, therefore, the 
answer to the question of how many systems of private law there are in Europe is: one single, 
composite system. It is based on the monist postulate of the unity of law. However, the 
relationship between the different elements, coming from national, European and international 
lawmakers, is not a matter of epistemological axioms but of political deliberation. The main 
procedural requirement is inclusion of everyone affected. The aim should be the rational 
reconstruction of the world of private law in terms of substantive principles of private and 
constitutional law. In very practical terms, this means we do not have a final answer to our 
question, only preliminary answers. However, that condition of uncertainty and provisionality is 
fundamentally different from the certainty that pluralists claim to have that there is no unity of 
national, European and international law". From an international perspective La Torre "Poverty of 
Global Constitutionalism" 63 seems to be in favour of a more dualist approach with regard to 
global constitutionalism: "Actually, what we are often offered by 'global constitutionalists' is an 
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5 Conclusion 
Globalism, and one of its more limited forms embodied in regionalism, has not left 
the relationship between international law, regional law and municipal law 
untouched. The modern world and the international community of states have in 
many respects developed into a global village and an international society facing 
common problems. In many ways they share a common destiny, and as a result 
have to collectively deal with complicated issues affecting all of them. 
The developments concerning the dichotomy between monism and dualism within 
the European Union must be noted by the African Union and its member states. The 
Constitutive Act of the African Union envisages the harmonisation of the laws of 
member states and eventually the political unification of the African continent. The 
role of international law, especially with regard to the protection of human rights in 
individual member states, is indispensable. The dualist doctrine, in contrast with the 
monist approach, may prove to be a stumbling block in allowing international law to 
take its rightful place in African Union law and the domestic law of its member 
states. However, a major reason why some states are reluctant to follow a monist 
approach with regard to the relationship between international law and municipal 
law could be ascribed to the fact that these states are extremely protective of their 
sovereignty and might view accepting the implications of the monist approach as 
subjecting themselves to an extra-territorial legislature. 
In this regard the approach of the South African Constitutional Court in Glenister is 
to be welcomed as it fully recognises the important role of international law in the 
domestic law of South Africa and in terms of an extensive interpretation of section 
231(2) of the Constitution (allowing its consequences to extend not only to the 
international, but also to the domestic level) follows a monist approach and thus 
extensive or analogical interpretation of constitutionalism, or just a rhetorical reference or appeal 
to it. It is a deracinated constitutionalism that is paraded here; it is constitutionalism without a 
constitution that we are served. The extensive, metaphorical use of the notion happens in such a 
way that constitutionalism's normative and pragmatic core comes out as watered down and 
radically impoverished. There is thus a programmatic poverty of global or supranational 
constitutionalism that is the outcome of its more or less explicit need to redefine, and by 
redefining to belittle, the intense and demanding normativity of modern constitutions". 
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ensures the maximum protection afforded by international law to individuals in South 
Africa. One cannot but fully agree with the following observation by Justice 
Cameron:60 
Perhaps the most profound lesson of Glenister is that in a globalized world there 
should be no cover from properly undertaken international law obligations in the 
thicket of domestic law. There should be consonance, not dissonance, between 
what governments say and do domestically. Our role as lawyers, and our duty, is to 
reduce the gap where it exists. 
60 Cameron 2013 Duke J Comp Int'l L 409. 
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